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HUMAN NATURE IN THE ADAPTATION OF TRUST 
 





































This chapter pleads for more inspiration from human nature, in agent-based modeling. 
As an illustration of an effort in that direction, it summarizes and discusses an agent-
based model of the build-up and adaptation of trust between multiple producers and 
suppliers. The central question is whether, and under what conditions, trust and loyalty 
are viable in markets. While the model incorporates some well known behavioural 
phenomena from the trust literature, more extended modeling of human nature is called 
for. The chapter explores a line of further research on the basis of notions of mental 
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For the object of study I choose trust, for several reasons. First, if anything is 
human, it is (dis)trust. Second, if anything is subject to adaptation, it is trust, in its 
build-up and breakdown, and as both the basis for a relationship and its outcome.  
Third, trust forms an important issue in economics, and in behavioural science 
more widely. Trust is needed to limit transaction costs and costs of contracting and 
control. In the literature on transaction costs and inter-firm relations there has been 
a debate whether trust can exist in markets, under pressures of competition. Agent-
based simulation seems an appropriate tool for experimentation, to investigate 
under what conditions trust is viable in markets. 
Many attempts have been made at agent-based modeling of trust and related issues. 
The purpose of trust models varies widely. Generally, they study emergent 
properties of complex interaction that would be hard or impossible to tackle 
analytically. Some study the effectiveness of sanctions and/or reputation 
mechanisms and agencies to support them, e.g. in information systems or supply 
chains (Zacharia et al., 1999; Meijer & Verwaart, 2005; Diekmann & Przepiorka, 
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2005), or in artificial societies (Younger, 2005). Some study self-organization, e.g. 
in the internalization of externalities in a common pool resource (Pahl-Wost & 
Ebenhöh, 2004), the emergence of leadership in open-source communities (Muller, 
2003), or the emergence of cooperative social action (Brichoux & Johnson, 2002). 
Others investigate the working of decision heuristics (Pahl-Wost & Ebenhöh, 
2004; Marsella et al., 2004).    
The general set-up is that of multiple agents who can profit from each other but are 
uncertain about the quality or competence that is offered, sometimes allowing for 
multiple dimensions of quality, and dependencies between them (Maximilien & 
Singh, 2005). Other studies focus on the benevolence or intentions of agents, i.e. 
absence of cheating, in free-ridership, defection or expropriation of knowledge or 
other resources, and many look at both competence and intentions (Castelfranchi & 
Falcone, 1999; Pahl-Wost & Ebenhöh, 2004; Breban, 2002; Muller, 2003; Gans et 
al., 2001). This is line with the distinction made in the trust literature between 
competence trust and intentional trust (see e.g. Nooteboom, 2002).  
Mostly, agents are oriented only towards their self-interest, such as maximum 
profit, but some studies also allow for fairness and equity as objectives or 
dimensions of value (Pahl-Wost & Ebenhöh, 2004). Mostly, trust is measured as a 
number beween zero and one, and, following Gambetta (1988), is often interpreted 
as a subjective probability that goals will be achieved or no harm will be done. 
Mostly, conduct is individual, but sometimes allowance is made for coalitions 
(Breban, 2002). 
Few studies of defection explicitly model both sides of the coin: the expectation of 
defection by others (trust) and one´s own inclination to defect (trustworthiness). 
Also, most studies treat trust as of purely extrinsic value, in the achievement of 
profit, and do not include the possible intrinsic value of trust. Notable exceptions 
are Pahl-Wost & Ebenhöh (2004) and Marsella et al. (2004). 
Trust is generally updated on the basis of experience, sometimes only one’s own 
experience in interaction, sometimes (also) on the basis of reputation mechanisms, 
sometimes with the services of some ´tracing agency´ (Zacharia et al., 1999; Meijer 
& Verwaart, 2005; Diekman & Przepiorka, 2005). Few studies are based on an 
explicit inference of competence or intentions, and even fewer studies explicitly 
model the decision heuristics used. Exceptions here also are Pahl-Wost & Ebenhöh 
(2004) and, with great psychological sophistication, Marsella et al. (2004). Those 
studies will be considered in more detail later. A key question is whether agents 
have ‘a theory of mind’ on the basis of which they attribute competencies and 
intentions to others.  
While most studies model trust as adaptive, in the sense that it develops as a 
function of private or public experience, there is very little study, as far as I know, 
of adaptiveness of the importance attached to trust relative to profit, and of the 
adaptiveness of one´s own trustworthiness or inclination to defect.                  
In this chapter, by way of  illustration, a model is discussed with some of these 
features. It focuses on intentional trust, in terms of loyalty or defection, based on 
private experience (no reputation effects). Trust is adapted on the basis of observed 
defection, but only with simple reinforcement, without theory of mind and explicit 
decision heuristics. Next to trust it includes own trustworthiness, i.e. inclination to 
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defect. Trustworthiness and the importance attached to trust are both adaptive, as a 
function of experience.  
The central purpose of the study is theoretical: to investigate whether the claim of 
transaction cost economics that trust cannot survive under competition 
(Williamson, 1993) is correct. Under what conditions, if at all, are trust and 
trustworthiness viable in markets where the performance criterion is purely profit? 
The analysis is conducted in the context of transaction relations between multiple 
buyers and suppliers, which is the classical setting for the analysis of transaction 
costs. Thus, the present chapter is related to other sections of the present volume, 
on ‘Industrial structures and innovation’ and ‘Supply chain management’.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it summarizes this example of an agent-based 
computational model of trust. Second, it explores possibilities to proceed further in this 
direction, in an attempt to bring more human nature into the modeling of trust, in the 
employment of decision making heuristics offered by social psychology.  
 
 




Trustworthiness may be based on self-interest, but also on benevolence, based on 
solidarity or loyalty. This is related to two different definitions of trust. According to one 
definition, trust entails vulnerability of the trustor to possibly harmful actions of the 
trustee, with the expectation that, for whatever reason, no great harm will be done. The 
reasons for this expectation may include control or deterrence, in which the trustee 
refrains from opportunism either because he has no opportunity for it, due to contractual 
or hierarchical constraints, or no incentives for it, since he is dependent on the trustor or 
wishes to protect his reputation. For this general notion, which includes safeguards on the 
basis of control, Nooteboom (2002) proposed not to use the term ‘trust’ but the more 
general term of ‘reliance’. Reasons for trustworthiness may also include motives that go 
beyond (narrow) self-interest, such as the wish to behave appropriately, according to 
social or moral norms or values, or empathy or identification with the trustor, in 
combination with feelings of sympathy, friendship or solidarity (MacAllister, 1995; 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). This is what people mostly mean by the term ‘trust’.  
 
Is trust viable in markets?  
 
I will summarize and discuss a model of the emergence and adaptation of trust published 
by Klos & Nooteboom (2001). The purpose of the model was to develop a tool for 
assessing the viability of trust, in the sense of benevolence, between firms in markets. 
That is a much-debated issue (for a survey, see Nooteboom, 2002). Economics, in 
particular transaction cost economics (TCE), doubts the viability of benevolence, on the 
argument that under competition, in markets, firms are under pressure to utilize any 
opportunistic opportunity for profit (Williamson, 1993). However, especially under the 
uncertainty and volatility of innovation reliance on the basis of control, such as complete 
contracts, but also reputation mechanisms, are infeasible or unreliable, so that especially 
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there benevolence is needed as a basis for governance, as a substitute or complement for 
necessarily incomplete contracts (Nooteboom, 1999, 2004) and reputation mechanisms. 
Thus, it is of some theoretical and practical importance to investigate whether, or when, 
benevolence may be viable. I propose that benevolence, going beyond calculative self-
interest, can exist in markets but is nevertheless subject to circumstances, such as 
pressures of survival, depending on intensity of competition and the achievement of 
profit (Pettit, 1995), and experience. The purpose of the model is to explore these 
circumstances.  
To serve its purpose, the model should incorporate essential elements of TCE logic. TCE 
proposes that people organize to reduce transaction costs, depending on conditions of 
uncertainty and specific investments, which yield switching costs and a resulting risk of 
‘hold-up’. The model employs TCE logic, but also deviates from TCE in two 
fundamental respects. First, while TCE assumes that optimal forms of organization will 
arise, yielding maximum efficiency, that is problematic. The making and breaking of 
relations between multiple agents with adaptive knowledge and preferences may yield 
complexities and path-dependencies that preclude the achievement of maximum 
efficiency. Even if all agents can in principle access all relevant partners, and have 
relevant knowledge about them, actual access depends on competition for access, and on 
unpredictable patterns of making and breaking relations among multiple agents. Second, 
while TCE assumes that reliable knowledge about loyalty or trustworthiness is 
impossible (Williamson, 1975), so that opportunism must be assumed, it is postulated 
here that to some extent trust is feasible, by inference from observed behaviour.  
The methodology of Agent Based Computational Economics (ACE) is well suited to 
model complexities of multiple interactions, and to see to what extent theoretical 
benchmarks of maximum efficiency can in reality be achieved. It enables us to take a 
process approach to trust (Zand, 1972; Zucker, 1986; Smith Ring &van de Ven, 1994; 
Gulati, 1995), by modeling the adaptation of trust and trustworthiness in the light of 




In the model, buyers and suppliers are matched on the basis of preferences that are 
based on both trust and potential profitability, where trust can also have intrinsic 
value. In this matching, depending on their preferences agents make, continue or 
break transaction relations. Trust is based on observed loyalty of partners, i.e. 
absence of switching to a different partner. In line with industrial economics, profit 
is a function of product differentiation (which increases profit margin), economy of 
scale from specialization, and learning by cooperation in ongoing relations. Use is 
made of the notion (from TCE) of specific investments in relationships. Those 
have value only within the relationship, and thus would have to be made anew 
when switching to a different partner. Specific investments yield more 
differentiated products, with a higher profit margin. Economy of scale yields an 
incentive for buyers to switch to a supplier who supplies to multiple buyers, which 
yields a bias towards opportunism, in breaking relations with smaller suppliers. 
However, this can only be done for activities that are based on general-purpose 
assets, not relation-specific investments for specialty products.  
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The percentage of specialty products is assumed to be equal to the percentage of  
specific investments, as a parameter of the model that can be set. The specialty 
part, which is relation-specific, yields higher profit, and is also subject to learning 
by cooperation, as a function of an ongoing relation. Thereby, it yields switching 
costs, and thus yields a bias towards loyalty.  
In sum, the model combines the essential features of TCE: opportunism by 
defection, specific investments, economy of scale for non-specific investments, and 
switching costs. However, the model adds the possibility of trust as a determinant 
of preference, next to potential profit.  
In the model, agents are adaptive in three ways. In the preference function, 
specified in an appendix, the relative weights of potential profit and trust are 
adaptive, as a function of realized profit. In this way, agents can learn to attach 
more or less weight to trust, relative to potential profit. Agents adapt their trust in a 
partner as a function of his loyalty, exhibited by his continuation of the 
relationship. As a relation lasts, trust increases incrementally, but with decreasing 
returns, and it drops discontinuously when defection occurs. Agents also adapt 
their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of exit from a relation, on the 
basis of realized profit. Agents only defect, in switching, when incremental 
preference exceeds the threshold. This models the idea that while agents maybe 
loyal, that has its limits. Thus, agents can learn to become more or less trustworthy 
in the sense of being loyal.  
Note that adaptation of both the weight attached to trust and the threshold of 
defection occurs on the basis of realized profit. This biases the model in favor of 
Williamson’s (1993) claim that trust cannot survive in markets. In the model, trust 
and trustworthiness can only emerge when they enhance realized profit. The model 
allows us to explore under what conditions, in terms of parameter settings, trust 
and loyalty increase, or are stable, i.e. when they are conducive to profit, and hence 
viable in markets.  
Starting values of agent-related parameters, such as initial trust, threshold of defection, 
and weight attached to trust, can be set for each agent separately. This allows us to model 
initially high or low trust societies, in setting parameters accordingly for all or most 
agents, or to model high trust agents in low trust societies, and vice versa, to study 
whether and when trust is viable, or is pushed out by opportunism. Other, non agent-
related parameters, such as the percentage of product differentiation and specific assets, 
strength of economy of scale, strength of learning by cooperation, speed with which trust 
increases with duration of a relation, number of buyers, number of suppliers, and number 
of time steps in a run, are fixed per experiment. 
In sum, the model is set up to experiment with conditions for trust to grow or decline, as a 
function of realized profit, depending on trade-offs between advantages of defection (for 
economy of scale) and advantages of loyalty (in learning by doing in an ongoing 




Initial expectations were as follows: 
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- In interactions between multiple, adaptive agents, maximum efficiency is seldom 
achieved, due to unforeseeable complexities of interaction 
- In conformance with TCE, in the absence of trust outsourcing occurs only at low 
levels of asset specificity 
- High trust levels yield higher levels of outsourcing at all levels of asset specificity 
- Under a wide range of parameter settings, high trust levels are sustainable in 
markets 
- The choice between an opportunistic switching strategy and loyalty depends on 
the relative strength of scale effects and learning by cooperation 
 
All these expectations are borne out by recent simulation experiments (Gorobets & 
Nooteboom, 2005). Of course, simulation is not equivalent to empirical testing. The test 
is virtual rather than real. It has only been shown that under certain parameter settings 
emergent properties of interaction satisfy theoretical expectations. The significance of 
this depends on how reasonable the assumptions in the model and the parameter settings 
are considered to be.  
The overall outcome is that both trust and opportunism can be profitable, but they go for 
different strategies. This suggests that there may be different individual agents or 
communities, going for different strategies, of switching or of loyalty, which settle down 
in their own self-sustaining systems. If we compare across the different settings of high, 
medium and low initial trust, under different conditions concerning the strength of scale 
effect relative to learning by cooperation, and concerning initial weight attached to trust 
and initial thresholds of defection, profit declines more often than it increases, as we go 
from high to low trust. Further details are given in Appendix B. 
The following paradox emerges from the analysis. Potential profit from learning by 
cooperation is highest for the highest level of product differentiation, but precisely then, 
when trust is low buyers prefer to make rather than buy, and thereby forego the 
opportunities for learning by cooperation. When buyers focus on profitability rather than 
trust, profit from economy of scale is instantaneous while learning by cooperation is 
slow, and the potential for economy of scale is low at high levels of differentiation. Thus, 
under low trust and low weight attached to it, buyers lock themselves out from the 
advantages of collaboration. When they outsource, it is mostly at low levels of 
differentiation, when learning by cooperation yields only modest returns, but then they 
learn to appreciate its accumulation in lasting relationships. They wind up in outsourcing 
at high differentiation only ‘by mistake’, then learn to appreciate it, and once learning by 
doing gets under way, a focus on profit keeps them in the relationship. In time, as profit 
turns out to be consistent with loyalty and trust, they learn to attach more weight to them.  
This illustrates a principle noted before, in the trust literature. As a default, i.e. a stance 
taken until reasons for an alternative stance appear (Minsky, 1975), trust is to be 
preferred to distrust. Excess trust can be corrected on the basis of experience with 
untrustworthy partners, while distrust prevents one from engaging in collaboration to 
learn that partners are in fact trustworthy, if that is the case.  
 
 
More Human Nature 
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Discussion of the model 
 
In the model, human nature is modeled to some extent. Trust is reinforced, incrementally, 
by observed loyalty, and drops discontinuously in case of observed disloyalty. In 
evaluating an actual or potential relationship, agents consider both potential profitability 
and trust they have, and the weight attached to the one relative to the other is adapted on 
the basis of experience, in the form of past profit. Similar adaptation applies to their own 
trustworthiness (absence of defection).  
However, modeling of cognition and decision-making is still primitive in that: 
 
- The rationality of agents is bounded in that they do not take into account 
opportunities that they have no own experience with, but that are observable. In 
particular, non-trusting agents who rob themselves of the opportunity to learn that 
collaboration and loyalty may be profitable do not learn from observing such 
profit of more trusting competitors. 
- In assessing trustworthiness from observed behaviour, agents are myopic, looking 
only at their own experience with the agent. In other words, the model does not 
contain a reputation mechanism and gossip.  
- Adaptation is highly automatic, in combination with random shifts. There is no 
modeling of processes of inference and decision-making, and of the emotions 
involved. The model does not incorporate a theory of mind.  
  
The first two shortcomings can be repaired without a fundamental shift of model design, 
by including spillovers of experience in a reputation mechanism, where profits and 
experiences of loyalty of (some or all) other agents contribute to one’s adaptation. The 
third shortcoming is much more fundamental, since it requires the modeling of social-
cognitive processes. Options for doing this are explored in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
More human nature from other studies 
 
Two studies I found stand out in their dealing with human nature in processes of 
inference and decision making. Pahl-Wost & Ebenhöh (2004) emphasize a human 
approach in terms of decision heuristics and mental that agents select from, such as a 
frame oriented towards cooperation or towards maximizing, as well as switching between 
frames as a function of experience. They recognize a range of relevant mental categories 
in cooperative behaviour: cooperativeness, fairness (concerning others and concerning 
me), conformity, reciprocity (positive and negative, in retribution), risk aversion, 
commitment, and trustworthiness (not being opportunistic). A large and necessary step in 
the modeling of agents is to equip them with a theory of mind, i.e. a basis for inferring 
competencies and intentions of other agents, as a basis for their decision making. This 
route of taking decision heuristics known from social psychology is also taken, with 
impressive sophistication, by Marsella et al. (2004), in their development of virtual 
agents. This modeling, of beliefs, influence and belief change, is intended as a training 
device, e.g. for teachers to learn how to deal with bullies in the classroom.  
I am confident that this is the way to go, for some applications at least. Reich (2004) 
pleads for the use of formal logic in the analysis of reactions to actions, and anticipated 
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reactions to that, on the basis of decision rules. That is no doubt valid, but a socio-
cognitive theory is needed to specify those rules. Below, I elaborate some further ideas to 
proceed along this line of bringing in more human nature, also using insights from social 
psychology.        
 
Deliberative and automatic response 
 
The trust literature recognizes a duality of rational and automatic response. In social 
psychology, Esser (2005) also recognized rational deliberation and automatic response as 
two modes of ‘information processing’. However, the non-deliberative or automatic 
mode seems to split into two different forms: unemotional routine and emotion-laden 
impulse, out of faith, friendship, suspicion, in a leap of faith or a plunge of fear. 
Emotions, which determine ‘availability’ to the mind, as social psychologists call it, may 
generate impulsive behaviour and may trigger a break of routinized behaviour. A 
question then is whether the latter automatically triggers an automatic response, or 
whether an emotionally triggered break with routine can lead on to a rational deliberation 
of response. For that, the emotion would have to be somehow neutralized, controlled, 
supplemented, or transformed for the sake of deliberation. In the build-up and breakdown 
of trust this is of particular importance in view of the indeterminacy of causation. 
Expectations may be disappointed due to mishaps, lack of competence or opportunism, 
and it is often not clear which is the case.  
If a relationship has been going well for some time, trust and trustworthiness may be 
taken for granted, in routinized behaviour. A jolt of fear from exceptional events may be 
needed to break out of the routine, but in view of the causal ambiguity of what went 
wrong, one may need to give the trustee the benefit of the doubt, allowing for mishaps or 
lack of competence, rather than jumping to the conclusion of opportunism. When does 
this happen and when not? 
In the trust literature, it has been proposed that as a relationship develops, at some point 
reliance (whether it is based on control or trust) is based on cognition, i.e. on knowledge 
concerning the intentions and capabilities of a trustee. Subsequently, actors may develop 
‘empathy’, i.e. understanding of how a partner feels and thinks, and next partners may 
develop ‘identification’, i.e. they see their fortunes as connected and they start to feel and 
think alike (McAllister, 1995; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). As noted by Luhmann (1980), 
when people start to cooperate, they get the chance to adopt each other’s perspectives. In 
empathy trust may be associated with feelings of solidarity and in identification with 
feelings of friendship. In going from knowledge based trust to empathy and identification 
based trust, behaviour appears to become less deliberative and more automatic, due to 




The question now is how we can further clarify the trust process, in terms of how people 
think and judge, making and adapting interpretations and choices of action, in a fashion 
that is amenable, at least in principle, to inclusion in an agent-based model.  
For this, I employ the notion of mental ‘framing’, adopted from sociology and social 
psychology (Lindenberg 2000, 2003; Esser 2005). According to Esser, a mental frame is 
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an ‘situation defining orientation’ that consists of ‘.. two simultaneously occurring 
selections: the selection of a mental model of the situation on the one hand and that of the 
mode of information processing in the further selection of action’(Esser 2005: 95, present 
author’s translation from the German). Thus, a mental frame is also associated with 
action scripts of response appropriate for enacting the frame. For mental frames, 
Lindenberg (2003) recognized three: ‘acting appropriately’ (AA), also called the 
‘solidarity frame’ (Wittek, 1999),  ‘guarding one’s resources’ (GR), to ensure survival, 
and a ‘hedonic frame’(H), where one gives in to temptations for gratifying the senses.  
These three frames are adopted here because they align closely with the distinction, in the 
trust literature, between ‘benevolence’ and ‘opportunism’, with the latter including both 
pressures of survival, which seems close to ‘guarding one’s resources’, and vulnerability 
to temptation when it presents itself, which seems close to the ‘hedonic frame’. The 
frames may support or oppose each other, and while at any moment one frame is 
‘salient’, in determining behaviour, conditions may trigger a switch to an alternative 
frame.  
If frames serve to both ‘define a situation’ (Esser) and to guide actions (Lindenberg), how 
are these two combined? As noted by Luhmann (1984: 157), in interaction people start 
building expectations of each others’ expectations, on the basis of observed actions. 
According to the notion of relational signaling (Lindenberg, 2000, 2003; Wittek 1999; 
Six, 2004) the actions that a trustee undertakes, triggered by a mental frame, in 
deliberation or automatic response, constitute relational signals that are observed and 
interpreted by the trustor.  
For frame selection I propose the following. The trustee selects a frame, which generates 
actions that function as signals to the trustor, who on the basis of these signals attributes a 
salient frame to the trustee and selects a frame for his own response, in the selection of a 
script, which generates actions taken as signals by the trustee, who attributes a frame to 
the trustor, and selects his own frame. This yields a cycle of selection and attribution, in 
ongoing interaction, as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that while a trustor (trustee) may 
select the same frame as the one attributed to the trustee (trustor), in what amounts to a 
‘tit-for tat response’, this is not necessarily the case. One may persevere in acting 
benevolently in the face of opportunism, and one may opportunistically exploit the 
benevolent. Along this cycle, in deliberative response people may try to anticipate effects 
of actions, their signaling and the response in attribution, selection and action. This 
models Luhmann’s notion of the formation of expectations of expectations.  
 
The following questions remain: 
 
1. How, more precisely, do frame selection and attribution take place 
2. How does frame selection lead to action? 
3. What determines automatic or deliberative response (in selection and attribution) 
 
Here, these questions cannot all be answered. For answers, use can be made of decision 
heuristics recognized in social psychology. For a survey see e.g. Bazerman (1998), and for 
further elaboration e.g. Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982). Here, I reflect a little further 
on how frame selection and attribution might be modeled.  
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Figure 1  Cycle of frame selection and attribution 
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The salience, and hence stability, of a frame, and the likelihood of switching to a 
subsidiary frame, depends on whether it is supported by those other frames. For example, 
acting appropriately, in a trustworthy fashion, is most stable when it also builds resources 
and satisfies hedonic drives. One will switch to a frame of self-interest when temptation 
or pressure exceeds one’s ability to resist. Conversely, one will switch from a self-
interested to an other-directed frame when threat or temptation subsides and loyalty 
assumes more prominence. Decision heuristics from social psychology may be used to 
understand how this happens (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Attribution of a self-interested frame (H, GR) to the trustee seems likely to trigger the 
defensive selection of a similar frame by the trustor, particularly when the attribution is 
based on strong triggers (‘availability’) of fear of loss, in what amounts to a ‘tit for tat’ 
strategy. However, that is not necessarily the case, even when the attribution is automatic 
rather than deliberative. People may control a shock of fear of loss and stick to an other-
directed frame (AA), in several ways. Firstly, such a response may be deliberative, in the 
realization that a misinterpretation may be at play, with a mis-attribution of opportunism 
where in fact a mishap or lack of competence may be the cause of failure. However, this 
may be a psychologically difficult feat to achieve, and one may need the sobering caution 
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from a third party or go-between. See Nooteboom (2002) for an analysis of roles that go-
betweens can play in the building and maintenance of trust. 
 
Table 1  Attribution and selection 
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Attribution 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
              automatic        deliberative 
                                                  routinised           impulsive 




automatic   routinised AA   
         GR     stability     
        H               rational inference 
    impulsive AA        
          GR         instability     
        H 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
deliberative         AA 
         GR   game-theoretic analysis 




The trustor may respond with a different frame from the one he attributed to the trustee, 
and both attribution and selection may be automatic, in the two ways of routinised or 
impulsive response, or deliberative. Three frames for attribution and selection (AA, GR, 
H), in three modes (routinised, impulsive, deliberative) yield 81 logically possible action-
response combinations, as illustrated in Table 1.  
Deliberative attribution entails rational inference of scripts and corresponding frames, 
and deliberative selection typically entails game-theoretic type analysis of projected 
response in attribution to chosen actions. Here, the connection between action scripts and 
mental frames may be confounded in ‘interest seeking with guile’: one may choose 
actions that belong to scripts that enact an AA frame, while in fact one’s salient frame is 
GR.  
Impulsive attribution combined with impulsive frame selection will tend to yield instable 
relations, while routinised attribution in combination with routinised selection, if 
attributed and selected frames are the same (lie on the diagonal of the table) is likely to 
result more in stable relations.  
The analysis demonstrates the importance of empathy, for correct attribution, on the basis 
of knowledge of the trustee’s idiosyncracies of conduct and thought, and his strengths 
and weaknesses, in competence, loyalty, and resistance to temptation and pressures of 
survival. 
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For example, one may try to interpret an action as enacting the frame of acting 
appropriately. For example, the trustee’s openness about a mistake is seen as fitting into 
the set of actions that belong to acting appropriately. In deliberate attribution one 
carefully tests assumptions concerning the attribution of a frame, considering whether 
other actions confirm that frame, and whether the action may also fit alternative frames. 
In routine attribution one attributes without much consideration, according to past 
anchors, and in impulsive attribution one tries to fit actions into frames that surge to 
attention as ‘available’ on the basis of fear or other emotion.  
From interaction, including the disappointment of expectations, one may learn and 
innovate in several ways. One may discover new variations upon existing repertoires of 
actions associated with a frame, a new allocation of actions across mental frames, novel 
actions or even novel mental frames. This learning may serve for a better attribution of 
frames to trustees, and for an extension of one’s own repertoires of action and mental 
frames. Here, even the breach of trust may be positive, as a learning experience, and may 




I have only been able to give a rough sketch of how human nature, as explained in social 
psychology, may provide a basis for modeling social-cognitive processes in agent-based 
models in general, and in the build-up and adaptation of trust in particular. Much work 
remains to be done in translating this into model design.  
In particular, we need to fill in the details of how frame attribution and selection take 
place, in Figure 1 and Table 1. This may be based, in more detail, on decision heuristics 
identified in social psychology.  
However, as recognized also by Marsella et al. (2004), there is the usual trade-off to be 
considered between detail and management of complexity. While, as Marsella et al. say, 
complexity may lie in the detail with which agents are modeled, this is feasible and 
desirable only with very few interacting agents, while in other studies complexity is 
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Appendix A: Details of the Model 
 
Preference and matching 
 





trustityprofitabilscore     (1)  
 
where: scoreij is the score i assigns to j, profitabilityij is the profit i can potentially make 
‘through’ j, trustij is i's trust in j and αi ∈ [0, 1] is the weight i attaches to profitability 
relative to trust, i.e. the ‘profit-elasticity’ of the scores that i assigns; i may adapt the 
value of αi from each timestep to the next.    
At each time step, all buyers and suppliers establish a strict preference ranking over all 
their alternatives. Random draws are used to settle the ranking of alternatives with equal 
scores. The matching of partners is modeled as follows. On the basis of preferences 
buyers are assigned to suppliers or to themselves, respectively. When a buyer is assigned 
to himself this means that he makes rather than buys. In addition to a preference ranking, 
each agent has a ‘minimum tolerance level’ that determines which partners are 
acceptable. Each agent also has a quota for a maximum number of matches it can be 
involved in at any one time. A buyer’s minimum acceptance level of suppliers is the 
score that the buyer would attach to himself. Since it is reasonable that he completely 
trusts himself, trust is set at its maximum of 1, and the role of trust in the score is ignored: 
α = 1. The algorithm used for matching is a modification of Tesfatsion's (1997) deferred 
choice and refusal (DCR) algorithm and it proceeds in a finite number of steps, as 
follows: 
  
1. Each buyer sends a maximum of oi requests to its most preferred, acceptable 
suppliers.  
2. Each supplier ‘provisionally accepts’ a maximum of aj requests from its most 
preferred buyers and rejects the rest (if any). 
3. Each buyer that was rejected in any step fills its quota oi in the next step by sending 
requests to next most preferred, acceptable suppliers that it has not yet sent a request 
to.   
4. Each supplier again provisionally accepts the requests from up to a maximum of aj 
most preferred buyers from among newly received and previously provisionally 
accepted requests and rejects the rest.  As long as one or more buyers have been 
rejected, the algorithm goes back to step 3. 
 
The algorithm stops if no buyer sends a request that is rejected. All provisionally 
accepted requests are then definitely accepted.  
 
Trust and trustworthiness 
 
An agent i's trust in another agent j depends on what that trust was at the start of their 



















1)1( ,ini,ini ,    (2) 
where  jit = agent i's trust in agent j, 
j
itt ,ini = agent i's initial trust in agent j, 
x = the past duration of the current relation between agents i and j, and 
f = trustFactor. 
 
This function is taken simply because it yields a curve that increases with decreasing 
returns, as a function of duration x, with 100% trust as the limit, and the speed of increase 
determined by the parameter f .   
In addition, there is a base level of trust, which reflects an institutional feature of a 
society. If an agent j, involved in a relation with an agent i, breaks their relation, then this 
is interpreted as opportunistic behavior and i’s trust in j decreases; in effect, i's trust drops 
by a percentage of the distance between the current level and the base level of trust; it 
stays there as i's new initial trust in j, j itt ,ini until the next time i and j are matched, after 
which is starts to increase again for as long as the relation lasts without interruption.  
The other side of the coin is, of course, one’s own trustworthiness. This is modelled as a 
threshold τ for defection. One defects only if the advantage over one’s current partner 
exceeds that threshold. It reflects that trustworthiness has its limits, and that trust should 
recognize this and not become blind (Pettit 1995, Nooteboom 2002). The threshold is 
adaptive, as a function of realized profit.  
 
Costs and profits 
 
Buyers may increase gross profits by selling more differentiated products, and suppliers 
may reduce costs by generating production efficiencies. There are two sources of 
production efficiency: economy of scale from a supplier producing for multiple buyers, 
and learning by cooperation in ongoing production relations. Economy of scale can be 
reaped only in production with general-purpose assets, and learning by cooperation only 
in production that is specific for a given buyer, with buyer-specific assets. 
We assume a connection between the differentiation of a buyer’s product and the 
specificity of the assets required to produce it. In fact, we assume that the percentage of 
specific products is equal to the percentage of dedicated assets. This is expressed in a 
variable di ∈ [0, 1]. It determines both the profit the buyer will make when selling his 
products and the degree to which assets are specific, which determines opportunities for 
economy of scale and learning by cooperation. 
Economy of scale is achieved when a supplier produces for multiple buyers. To the 
extent that assets are specific, for differentiated products, they cannot be used for 
production for other buyers. To the extent that products are general purpose, i.e. 
production is not differentiated, assets can be switched to produce for other buyers. In 
sum, economy of scale, in production for multiple buyers, can only be achieved for the 
non-differentiated, non-specific part of production, and economy by learning by 
cooperation can only be achieved for the other, specific part.  















1,0max ,    (3) 
where: 
for the scale effect, f=scaleFactor, x is general-purpose assets of supplier j summed over 
all his buyers and scale efficiency jsey ,= ; 
for the learning effect, f=learnFactor; x is the number of consecutive matches between 
supplier j and buyer i and learning efficiency i jley ,= .   
Formula (3) expresses decreasing returns for both scale and experience effects. For the 
scale effect, it shows positive values along the vertical axis only for more than 1 general-
purpose asset. This specifies that a supplier can be more scale-efficient than a buyer 
producing for himself only if the scale at which he produces is larger than the maximum 
scale at which a buyer might produce for himself. For the learning effect, a supplier’s 
buyer-specific efficiency is 0 in their first transaction, and only starts to increase if the 
number of transactions is larger than 1. If a relation breaks, the supplier’s efficiency due 
to his experience with the buyer drops to zero. The resulting specification of profit is 




Agents adapt the values for α ∈ [0, 1] (weight attached to profit relative to trust) and τ [0, 
0.5] (threshold of defection) from one time step to the next, which may lead to changes in 
the scores they assign to different agents. Here, adaptation takes place on the basis of 
past, realized profit. While τ  could conceivably rise up to 1, a maximum of 0.5 was set 
because initial simulations showed that otherwise relations would get locked into initial 
situations, with little switching. Note that this biases the model in favour of opportunism.    
At each time step, each agent assigns a ‘strength’ to each possible value of α and τ. This 
expresses the agent’s confidence in the success of using that particular value. The various 
strengths always add up to constants Cα and Cτ, respectively. At the start of each 
timestep, the selection of values for α and τ is stochastic, with selection probabilities 
equal to relative strengths, i.e. strengths divided by Cα and Cτ, respectively. The strengths 
of the values that were chosen for α and τ at the start of a particular timestep are updated 
at the end of that timestep, on the basis of the agent's performance during that timestep, in 
terms of realized profit: the agent adds the profit obtained during the timestep to the 
strengths of the values that were used for α or τ. After this, all strengths are renormalized 
to sum to Cα and Cτ again (Arthur 1993). The idea is that the strength of values that have 
led to high performance (profit) increases, yielding a higher probability that those values 
will be selected again. This is a simple model of ‘reinforcement learning’ (Arthur 1991, 




The algorithm of the simulation is presented by the flowchart in Fig.1. This figure shows 
how the main loop is executed in a sequence of discrete time steps, called a ‘run’. Each 
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simulation may be repeated several times as multiple runs, to even out the influence of 
random draws in the adaptation process. At the beginning of a simulation, starting values 
are set for certain model parameters. The user is prompted to supply the number of 
buyers and suppliers, as well as the number of runs, and the number of timesteps in each 
run. At the start of each run, all agents are initialized, e.g. with starting values for trust, 
and selection probabilities for α and τ. In each timestep, before the matching, each agent 
chooses values for α and τ, calculates scores and sets preferences. Then the matching 
algorithm is applied. In the matching, agents may start a relation, continue a relation and 
break a relation. A relation is broken if, during the matching, a buyer does not send any 
more requests to the supplier, or he does, but the supplier rejects them. 
 







































After matching, suppliers that are matched to buyers produce and deliver for their buyers, 
while suppliers that are not matched do nothing. Buyers that are not matched to suppliers 
produce for themselves (‘self-matched’, in ‘make’ rather than ‘buy’). Afterward, all 
buyers sell their products on the final-goods market. Profit is shared equally with their 
supplier, if they have one. Finally, all agents use that profit to update their preference 
rankings (via α and τ), used as input for the matching algorithm in the next timestep. 
 20
Across timesteps realized profits are accumulated for all buyers and suppliers, and all the 
relevant parameters are tracked.  
Note that, by implication, suppliers may fail to produce, and then have zero profit. Thus, 
there is no explicit mechanism of death. However, the procedure may be interpreted as 
exit of all suppliers with zero profit, accompanied by potential entry on new suppliers, 
announcing their readiness to give quotes to buyers, up to the maximum number of 
suppliers specified for the run. Note also that it is conceivable, given the logic of 
matching, that a supplier breaks with a buyer in his aim to go for a more attractive one, 
then lose the bidding for that buyer, and be left empty-handed. Then, it would be more 
reasonable for the supplier to first verify his goal attainment before breaking his existing 
relationship. However, in a large set of simulations, across a wide area of parameter 
space, this happened only once, at a very high level of opportunism, and it may not be 
unrealistic that sometimes such error is made, in an over-eagerness to switch to a more 
attractive partner.  
 
 
Appendix B: Details of Simulation Outcomes 
 
High initial trust dictates buy relative to make for all levels of specific investments. For 
high specific investments, buyers’ maximum profit is almost the same as in the cases of 
average or low initial trust. Low initial trust imposes make relative to buy, but buyers’ 
maximum profits for low specific investments are smaller than in the case of high initial 
trust. Overall, across all parameter settings, profit tends to be higher under high than 
under low trust.  
Under medium or low trust, high product differentiation favours make relative to buy 
because the switching cost is larger and there is less potential for economy of scale. But if 
learning by cooperation becomes stronger, relative to scale effects, buyers employ that 
advantage in a strategy of ongoing relations with suppliers, and achieve a higher profit 
than when they make themselves. If agents put their emphasis on trust (α=0) and loyalty 
(τ=0.5) buyers get a big advantage in the terms of profit for high specific investments by 
following the strategy of learning by cooperation. If agents focus on profitability rather 
than on trust (α=1) and neglect loyalty (opportunistic, τ=0) buyers get some advantage 
for low specific investments by following the scale strategy (50%) and producing 
themselves (50%). But if agents are loyalists (τ=0.5) buyers get an advantage for both 
low and average d by following the scale strategy (60% and 40% respectively) and 
producing themselves (40% and 60% respectively). Generally, under low trust and low 
weight attached to trust, buyers forego opportunities for collaboration that may yield 
learning by cooperation. In sum, high initial trust favours outsourcing (‘buy’) and it gives 
an advantage for all agents in comparison with low initial trust, where buyers get a 
smaller profit by insourcing (‘make’).  
In addition to the expected results, the model yields a few unanticipated results. One is 
that buyers organize closer to maximum possible efficiency for high levels of specific 
investments/specialization. The reason is that for low levels of specific investments there 
is more scope for scale effects, but this is difficult to attain by having suppliers supply to 
the maximum number of buyers. A strong effect of learning by cooperation, a high 
weight attached to trust, and high loyalty favour the learning by cooperation strategy for 
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high levels of specific investments, while a high weight attached to profit and high 
loyalty favour the scale strategy for low and average levels of specific investments. 
Finally, it is not always the case that a high weight attached to profitability relative to 
trust favours opportunism. Once a buyer begins to profit from learning by cooperation, an 
emphasis on profit may also lead to loyalty, in an ongoing relationship. 
 
 
 
 
